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Abstract:We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest
in general training of their workers. We consider a model where firms first decide
whether to invest in general human capital, then make wage offers for each others’
trained employees and finally engage in imperfect product market competition.
Equilibria with and without training, and multiple equilibria can emerge. If com-
petition is sufficiently soft and trained workers are substitutes, firms may invest
in non-specific training if others do the same, because they would otherwise suffer
a competitive disadvantage or need to pay high wages in order to attract trained
workers. Government intervention can be socially desirable to turn training into
a focal equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long wondered why firms provide incentives for employees
to invest in productivity-enhancing general human capital, rather than pro-
viding them only with firm-specific knowledge. After all, general training
investments make the workers potentially more valuable for other employers.
The famous arguments by Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) suggest that,
with competitive labor markets, firms have no incentive to bear the costs of
general worker training, as the associated rents accrue fully to the employees:
if training investments are contractible, workers will obtain the full increase in
marginal product resulting from the investment. However, these predictions
seem at odds with reality (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Franz and Soskice
1995, Katz and Ziderman 1990, OECD 1999). In some countries, such as
e.g. Germany or Switzerland, firms voluntarily pay for apprenticeships that
provide workers with general skills.1 In addition, firms continually pay for
on-the-job training of incumbent workers.2
We provide an explanation of such general training that relies on im-
perfect competition on the product market. We argue in the setting of a
three-stage game. In a first stage (training stage), two initially identical
firms decide on how many workers they want to train. In a second stage
(turnover stage), firms compete through wage offers for the trained workers;
workers accept the better offer. Finally, in the product market stage, firms
engage in oligopolistic product market competition. Training and turnover
decisions in the first two stages determine the distribution of trained work-
ers and thereby product market profits: Excluding the costs of training and
wages, we assume that profits of a firm depend positively on their own num-
1For instance, Bardeleben et al. (1995) calculate the net costs per apprentice per year
in German industry as DM 20509 per year if fixed costs are included, and DM 9194 if they
are not. A considerable part of this training is general - for instance, apprentices spend
about 65 days per year in external schools and courses.
2Several recent empirical studies show that a significant part of the training is general:
Baily and Gersbach (1995), Blundell et al. (1996), Goux and Maurin (1997), Loewenstein
and Spletzer (1998), Regner (1995, 1997) and Vilhuber (1997, 1998).
2
ber of trained workers and negatively on the competitor’s, as trained workers
increase productivity.
When firms compete for trained workers in the second stage, equilibrium
wages will correspond to the marginal contribution of a trained worker to
product market profits, for a given total supply of workers. This marginal
value has two components. First, an additional worker in the own firm is
directly beneficial for product market profits, because it increases the own
productivity. Second, the fact that the competitor does not employ this
worker is beneficial because it weakens the competitor. In a second stage
equilibrium, no worker should provide a higher marginal contribution to the
profits of its firm than it would to the competitor — otherwise there will be
additional turnover. Building from this idea, we introduce a plausible condi-
tion, ”Decreasing Returns to Attracting Workers” (DRAW). This condition
will imply that industry profits are maximized if workers are spread evenly
accross firms. Therefore, only for an even spread of workers will the gain for
any firm from poaching any number of competitors be smaller than the com-
petitor’s loss. Thus, wage bidding guarantees that in the equilibrium of the
turnover game all workers will be spread uniformly across firms, no matter
how training levels were distributed before the turnover stage. We further
show that, under (DRAW), wages usually decrease as additional workers are
trained: Intuitively, the competition on the labor market increases.
With these results in place, it is also clear that, with (DRAW), if one
firm trains  workers, both firms will have 2 additional workers in equi-
librium. Thus - apart from the direct costs it involves - training by a firm 
has four kinds of effects which result from the change in second-period equi-
librium brought about by an increase in trained workers. First, training has
a positive profit effect arising because firm  will employ half of the addi-
tional trained workers, thereby increasing own productivity. Second, there is
a negative effect arising because half of the additional trained workers will be
employed in the other firm, thereby increasing the competitor’s productivity.
Third, there is a negative effect on profits arising because firm  will have to
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pay wages to half of the additional trained workers. Fourth, additional com-
petition among trained workers tends to decrease wages of the inframarginal
workers.
We show that the two positive effects of training often dominate over the
negative effects, so that training can indeed result in equilibrium. We then
proceed to strengthen the argument that softer product market competition
makes the training equilibrium more likely. To this end, we use theoreti-
cal arguments as well as simulations. It turns out that a large market size
or a high extent of product differentiation strengthen the training equilib-
ria, and quantity competition makes the equilibrium more likely than price
competition. Potentially, our theory should thus allow us to explain cross-
sectoral differences in training expenditures.3 In the light of our model, the
widespread perception that firms have recently become less willing to invest
in general training might be the result of increased product market competi-
tion. In this respect, our paper goes beyond existing theory, which assumes
perfect product market competition and thus cannot use different intensities
of product market competition as an explanatory variable.
Finally, we discuss which institutional coordination mechanisms can move
firms into the training equilibrium in cases with multiple equilibria: indus-
try associations, wage bargaining between employer associations and unions
and government intervention. This suggests that cross-country differences
in the extent to which such coordination mechanisms are established might
explain the differences in general worker training observed in OECD (1999),
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), Booth and Snower (1996).
Alternative explanations of why firms encourage general training invest-
ments rely on labor market imperfections caused by asymmetric information.4
3The above-mentioned study by Bardeleben et al. (1995) shows great differences in
training intensities across different sectors. Net variable expenditures per worker and
year differ between DM 1002.- (food industry) and DM 20,565 (chemical industry). In
terms of gross expenditure, the differences are still large, ranging from DM 12,142.- (road
construction) to DM 32,027 (chemical industry).
4For a survey of such explanations see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999). These authors
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Essentially, if present employers can observe ability or training investments
better than potential future employers, the latter will face a lemon’s prob-
lem.5 As a result, it is difficult for the employee to sell herself on the job mar-
ket. The original employer enjoys ex post informational monopsony power,
the anticipation of which creates incentives to finance general training. While
our theory of training focuses on product market imperfections and does not
involve asymmetric information, it shares the feature of multiple equilibria
with the models of asymmetric information in the labor market by Katz and
Ziderman (1990), Chang and Wang (1995, 1996), Abe (1994), Prendergast
(1992), Glaeser (1992), Acemoglu (1997) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998).
In the following, we spell out these arguments in more detail. In section 2,
we introduce the assumptions of our model. In section 3, we present our first
results, using the simplifying assumption that each firm can train at most
one worker. Section 4 relaxes this assumption. In section 5, we discuss policy
implications. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The structure of the model is as follows. In period 1, firms  = 1 2 simultane-
ously choose their general human capital investment levels  ∈ {0 1 2 }.
Think of  as the number of its employees receiving general training. Train-
ing a worker costs   0 for a firm.6 Denote firm ’s trained workers as
1     . At the beginning of period 2, firm  can make individual
wage offers 	 (
 ) for each of their own workers and 	( ) for
also discuss some alternative theories that do not rely on asymmetric information (see also
Stevens (1994), Kessler and Lu¨lfesmann (2000)).
5Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) deal with the case of asymmetric information about
ability; Katz and Ziderman (1990) and Chang and Wang (1996) consider asymmetric
information about training investments.
6As the incentive of workers to acquire general human capital is undisputed, we ignore
the possibility of training investments by workers and deliberately assume that the entire
training costs are borne by the firm.
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each of the competitor 
’s worker (
 6= ). In principle, we allow wages to dif-
fer even for individuals who have the same level of human capital or belong to
the same firm.7 We normalize wages of non-trained workers to zero. Further,
we assume that the wage of the non-trained worker is also the reservation
wage for the trained workers, that is, their knowledge is useless outside the
industry under consideration. After having obtained the wage offers, each
employee accepts the higher offer.8 Denote the number of trained workers
in firm  at the end of period 2 as . Having workers with general human
capital is beneficial for the present employer; it could for instance help to re-
duce production costs, or to increase demand by improving product quality.
This feeds into our modeling of product market competition in period 3 as
follows.
Assumption 1: For each combination ( ) of trained workers, there
exists a unique product market equilibrium with resulting gross product market
profit  ( ) =  ( ) for firm . For firms  = 1 2  ( ) is
increasing in  and decreasing in .
Intuitively, the higher the number of trained workers in a firm, the greater
productivity and thus the higher the market profit. The higher the number
of trained workers in the competitor’s firm, the higher the competitor’s pro-
ductivity and thus the lower the own profit.
Assumption 1 contains several implicit statements about the training
technology and product market competition. To start with, note that 
is a function of  and , not of  and . This has two immediate im-
plications. First, if an employee leaves the firm, the original employer loses
all the benefits generated by the human capital investment - the employee
leaves no traces once he has left the firm. This is compatible with the as-
sumptions in training theories that are based on labor market imperfections.
7Here ”wages” should be interpreted broadly, including any type of non-monetary ben-
efits such as pleasant working environments, fringe benefits and flexible working hours
which involve costs for the employer.
8As a tie-breaking rule, we use the convention that the employee stays in his original
firm if  = .
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Second, training a worker and hiring a trained worker are perfect substitutes.
This assumption differs from the training literature which argues that one’s
own workers and competitors’ workers are imperfect substitutes, because the
ability of the own worker is better known. We use perfect substitutability
to express the generality of human capital in its starkest form, and we shall
show later on that general training can arise in equilibrium, in spite of this
assumption. Finally, note that the profit function  does not depend on 
directly, only on the number of trained workers. Thus, firms are treated
symmetrically.
It will sometimes be convenient to assume  ( ) is defined for arbi-
trary positive numbers, not just for integers:  ∈  refers to situations
such that at least one worker works part-time. In addition, we shall suppose
that  is differentiable. We use the following notation:
• The gross product market profit for symmetric firms, i.e., for firms
which have the same state variable: b() =  ( ) with  =  = 
• Net product market profits: Π ( ) =  ( )− 	 
• Long-term payoff : Π ( )−  · 
Finally, we impose an assumption on product market competition that is
slightly more restrictive than assumption 1: Gross profits increase if, starting
from a symmetric situation, both firms increase the number of workers by
the same amount.
Assumption 2: b

≥ 0
The game structure is summarized in the Table 1.
We can treat this game as a two period game, as all the relevant infor-
mation about period 3 is contained in the reduced form profit  ( ).
3 A simple example: one worker per firm
We start with a simple example. Suppose training is a (0 1)-decision, such
that each firm is limited to training one worker at most. This case is obviously
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Table 1: Game Structure
Period 1: Firms  = 1 2 choose training levels 
Period 2: (i) Firms choose wage offers 	(
 );	(
 )
(ii) Workers choose between employers, thus determining the
numbers  of trained workers.
Period 3: Product market competition results in gross profits ( ).
unrealistic, but the intuition is essentially the same as in the more general
case of arbitrarily many trained workers. In sections 3.1 and 3.2, we analyze
the second stage if one or two workers, respectively, have been trained. Then
we consider subgame perfect equilibria.
3.1 The turnover game for one trained worker
Consider the second stage of the game, assuming that only one of the two
firms has trained its worker. To understand equilibrium wage offers, first
recall that for each firm there are two reasons why having a trained worker
is valuable. First, it increases the own productivity. Second, it decreases the
competitor’s productivity. Accordingly, the total effect of a trained worker
on gross profits is (1 0) − (0 1) = [(1 0)− (0 0)] + [(0 0)− (0 1)].
Both firms thus have identical valuations for the worker, and wages will be
bid up to (1 0) − (0 1). Hence, being indifferent between the maximal
wage offers of both firms, the worker stays with his initial employer. Thus,
in equilibrium, the employer of the trained employee has a net profit  (1 0)−
[ (1 0)−  (0 1)] =  (0 1)  Net product market profits for the competitor
are also  (0 1).
The wage offer illustrates the problem of firms when only one firm has
invested in training. Essentially, the worker extracts the entire difference
between the gross profits of a firm that has a trained worker and the profits
of a firm that has none, and both firms are worse off than without training.
This would appear to strengthen Becker’s argument (Becker 1964) that firms
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have no incentives to invest in general human capital. If, as assumption 1
requires, gross product market profits depend negatively on the competitor’s
training level [(0 1)  (0 0)], incentives to invest are negative rather than
zero: even if  were equal to zero, a firm would be better off not investing at
all. A firm that invests in human capital makes itself vulnerable to the threat
that its worker leaves the firm, thus hurting the firm not only by increasing
its own costs, but also by decreasing the competitor’s cost. It does not
matter whether the worker actually carries out the threat: if she does, the
original employer will lose gross product market profits of (1 0) − (0 1),
if not, wage payments of the same amount will be necessary. As a result,
firms would even be willing to pay a positive amount of money to prevent
employees from acquiring human capital even when there are no training
costs. In the case of arbitrarily many workers treated in section 4 it will turn
out that the effect described is always present, but countervailing effects can
potentially destroy the no-training-equilibrium.
3.2 The turnover game for two trained workers
We next investigate the turnover game when each firm has trained one
worker. Let  =  +  =  + . Then, to denote the value of an ad-
ditional trained worker, if the own number of trained workers is  and the
total number is , we write

¡
 
¢
= 
¡
 + 1 −  − 1
¢
− 
¡
 − 
¢

In our example,  (0 2) =  (1 1)−  (0 2) is the value of having one of
the workers rather than having none at all, given that two workers have been
trained. Given the initial distribution of workers (1 = 2 = 1),  (0 2) is the
willingness to pay to prevent the departure of a worker to the competitor.
On the other hand,  (1 2) =  (2 0)−  (1 1) is the willingness to pay for a
second worker. The following definition will be crucial.
Definition 1 If  ( ) is decreasing in , we shall say that there are
Decreasing Returns to Attracting Workers (DRAW).
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Figure 1: The turnover game
The equilibrium depends on whether  ( ) is decreasing or increasing
in .9 To see this, we first introduce additional notation. 	 ( ) is the
wage payment that is necessary to obtain the services of one more worker,
assuming that the number of own workers is  and the total number of
workers is . In our example, 	 (0 2) =  (1 2) and 	 (1 2) =  (0 2).
To have one worker rather than none, one has to pay as much (	 (0 2)) as
the competitor would pay for having two workers rather than one ( (1 2)).
To have two workers rather than one, one has to pay as much (	 (1 2)) as
the competitor would pay for having one worker rather than none ( (0 2)).
Figure 1 describes the equilibrium.
Figure 1a corresponds to the case (DRAW) where
 (0 2)   (1 2)  (1)
9As we will show in a specific example, both cases are possible in principle.
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Figure 1b corresponds to  (0 2)   (1 2). With Figure 1a, it is straightfor-
ward to show that, in equilibrium,  =  = 1 if  (0 2)   (1 2). First,
note that each firm would be prepared to pay at most  (1 2) for a second
worker. But this is less than what the firm would have to pay to attract
this worker, namely 	 (1 2) =  (0 2). Thus, if both firms offer a wage of
 (1 2) to both workers, this will be an equilibrium. With these wages, both
workers are indifferent between employers, and stay where they are. Clearly,
there is no incentive to reduce wages unilaterally: By doing so, the firm
would save the wages for one worker ( (1 2))  but gross profits would fall
by  (0 2)   (1 2). Conversely, by increasing wages to 	   (1 2), a firm
would be able to hire the second worker. This would increase gross profits
by  (1 2) which would not make up for the increase in wage payments.10
Similar arguments show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium with
an even distribution of workers if  (0 2)   (1 2). Intuitively, starting from
a symmetric situation, for each firm poaching the second worker is more
attractive than it is for the competitor to keep the worker. Further, there
will be an equilibrium where one firm employs both workers, paying wages
of  (1 2) to one and  (0 2) to the other one, which leads to a wage sum
of  (2 0) −  (0 2). As a result, net profits are  (0 2) for both firms.11
Summing up, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 :(a) Suppose two workers have been trained and condition
(1) holds. There is no turnover in the period 2 equilibrium. Equilibrium
wages are  (1 2) =  (2 0)−  (1 1), net profits are 2 (1 1)−  (2 0) 
10Clearly, the equilibrium wage of the turnover game is not uniquely defined: Any wage
between  (1 2) and  (0 2) is an equilibrium. From the firm’s point of view, the equilibria
are Pareto ranked: The low-wage equilibrium  (1 2) dominates all the other equilibria.
11As both firms have the same net profits, they are indifferent between having no workers
or having both workers. For the firm that employs both workers, not employing the more
expensive worker would lead to savings of (1 2), but also to gross profit losses of the
same size. Similarly, attracting the cheaper worker does not increase net profits of the
firm without any employee. Note, however, that the equilibrium is in weakly dominated
strategies.
11
(b) If condition (1) does not hold, there is no pure strategy equilibrium without
turnover. There is an equilibrium where one firm employs both worker, paying
wages of  (0 2) to one worker and  (1 2) to the other. Net profits are then
 (0 2) for both firms.
Understanding the equilibrium distribution of workers is thus tantamount
to understanding the sign of  (1 2) −  (0 2). First, what exactly does the
value of an additional worker depend on? In short,  (1 2) and  (0 2)
embody both the training technology and the nature of competition. For
definiteness, suppose having a trained worker is valuable because it per-
mits production of any output level at lower marginal costs. Thus, think of
marginal costs as a decreasing function  (). Suppose that gross product
market profits are a function e ( ) that is decreasing in own marginal
costs and increasing in the competitor’s marginal costs.12 Then  ( ) =e ( ()   ())  Poaching an additional worker means that the own costs
will decrease and the competitor’s costs will increase. The strength of both
effects depends on the training technology, more precisely, on the marginal
cost effect of training
¯¯¯
	

¯¯¯
. Further, it is necessary to understand how the
own cost reduction and the competitor’s cost increase translate into profit
increases. Thus, the marginal profit effect of own costs
³¯¯¯

	
¯¯¯´
as well as
the marginal profit effect of competitor costs
³

	
´
influence the value of a
trained worker. Loosely speaking, the value of poaching a worker is higher
the higher the marginal cost effect of training, the marginal profit effect
of own costs and the marginal profit effects of competitor costs. Whether
(DRAW) holds, that is, whether the value of poaching a worker is increasing
or decreasing in , thus depends on how these effects vary with . We shall
illustrate this with an example.
Suppose the two firms are Cournot competitors, producing homogeneous
goods, with market demand  =  − , where  is output,  is price and 
is a positive constant. Suppose marginal costs are a function of the number
12This is true for almost every duopoly model.
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of trained workers with  (0) =   (1) =  − ∆ and  (2) =  − (1 + )∆
  0, ∆  0
Using Proposition 1 and the standard result that profits in a Cournot
duopoly with linear demand and marginal costs ( ) are
(
−2	+	)2
9
, we
obtain
Corollary 1 Suppose that in the linear Cournot example two workers have
been trained. Then, after the turnover game, workers are evenly distributed
if and only if
(− ) (2− 2) +∆
¡
2− 5 (1 + )2
¢
≥ 0
Figure 2, which corresponds to ∆ = 02, plots the combinations of the
market size parameter  ≡ −  and the technology parameter  for which
workers are evenly distributed in equilibrium. The upper line describes the
upper boundary of this regime.13 The parameter  has to be sufficiently
small, so that the second worker has small effects on marginal costs, and
market size (− ) has to be large, that is, competition is soft.
3.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Section 3.1 has shown that no equilibrium can exist such that only one firm
trains its worker. We now show that, if (DRAW) holds, training by both
firms may arise in subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Suppose each firm can train at most one worker.
(a) A subgame perfect equilibrium with training exists if and only if
2 (1 1)−  (2 0)−  (0 1) ≥  (2)
(b) In addition, for arbitrary parameter values, there is an equilibrium without
training.
13The lower line will be explained in the next section.
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Figure 2: Upper Line: Upper boundary of the region where (DRAW) holds;
Lower Line: Upper boundary of the Training region
Proof. We first show that (2) implies existence of a training equilib-
rium. First note that (2) implies (1), because 2 (1 1)−  (2 0)−  (0 1) 
2 (1 1)− (2 0)− (0 2) =  (0 2)− (1 2). Therefore, if both firms train,
wages are  (2 0)−  (1 1), and long-term payoffs are 2 (1 1)−  (2 0)− .
By the arguments in section 3.1, deviation to no training would result in net
product market profits of  (0 1), from which the result follows.
To show necessity of (2) for training, first suppose (2) does not hold, but (1)
does. Firms would still receive long-term payoffs of 2 (1 1) −  (2 0) − 
with training, but deviation to no training would be profitable. If (1) does
not hold, proposition 1 implies that net profits are  (0 2) and thus long-term
payoffs are  (0 2)−  if both firms train. By deviating to no training a firm
could guarantee itself  (0 1).
Part (b) relies on the arguments laid out in section 3.1: Without training,
firms both obtain long-term payoffs  (0 0). Unilateral training leads to
net product market profits of  (0 1) and long-term payoffs  (0 1) −  
14
 (0 1)   (0 0) 
Before giving a general interpretation of the result, it is helpful to analyze
the equilibrium condition for the Cournot example. Training by both firms
is an equilibrium if an only if
2 (1− 2) ≥ ∆
¡
3 + 8 + 42
¢
+
9
∆

The lower line in Figure 2 displays the upper boundary of this parameter
regime, assuming that  = 0. Obviously, choosing   0 would result in a
downward shift of this curve. Nevertheless, for sufficiently low values of ,
there is training in equilibrium, provided market size  is high, the comple-
mentarity parameter  is low and the marginal cost effect of training the first
worker (∆) is sufficiently small.
What is the intuition behind the training equilibrium? It is well known
(Acemoglu and Pischke 1999) that general training requires a compressed
wage structure : training increases productivity by more than it increases
wages. In which sense is the wage structure compressed in our setting? In
our framework, ”productivity” effects are best defined as gross profit effects.
To define them, suppose competitor 
 has trained one worker.
Consider as a first reference point the situation where  does not train a
worker and does not poach the competitor’s worker. In this reference situa-
tion, firm  thus has gross product market profits  (0 1) and wages 0. Under
condition (1) training would result in gross product market profits  (1 1)
and wages  (2 0)− (1 1). In this interpretation, the productivity effect of
training is thus  (1 1) −  (0 1), the wage effect is  (2 0) −  (1 1). Con-
dition 2 is thus equivalent to the requirement that the productivity effect is
greater than the wage effect.
An alternative interpretation of productivity and wage effects will be
helpful in the following. Consider as a reference point the situation where
firm  does not train, but poaches the trained worker instead. As discussed
earlier, this also results in net product market profits of  (0 1). However,
gross product market profits in the reference point are now  (1 0) and wages
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are  (1 0)− (0 1). Training would result in gross profits  (1 1) and wages
 (2 0)− (1 1). Clearly  (1 1)   (1 0). By (DRAW),  (2 0)− (1 1) 
 (1 1) −  (0 2) ≤  (1 0) −  (0 1). Thus, in this interpretation, training
implies that both gross product market profits and wages fall. Gross profits
fall because the trained worker will end up with the competitor. Wages fall
because the competition between trained workers reduces firms’ willingness to
pay for them. Obviously, by condition (1), the wage effect is stronger than
the gross profit effect, resulting in positive training effects on net profits.
Again, this is consistent with the notion of a compressed wage structure.
The idea that, as a result of training, increased competition between
workers may drive down wages will be central in our following generalizations.
Before, we discuss the case of Bertrand competition to show that with tough
product market competition, training cannot arise in equilibrium.
3.4 Bertrand competition
Under Bertrand competition, firms only earn positive gross profits if they
have strictly lower marginal costs than the competitor. Thus, if higher 
corresponds to lower costs, condition (DRAW) is violated since  (0 2) = 0
and  (1 2) =  (2 0)  0. Thus, by proposition 1 (b), both firms obtain net
profits of  (0 2) = 0 and by proposition 2 the following result is immediate.
Proposition 3 Suppose each firm is allowed to train at most one worker.
In the Bertrand case, training never arises in equilibrium.
As Bertrand competition is essentially the same as perfect competition,
this reinforces the idea that general training requires some degree of product
market imperfection, which also showed up in the Cournot example in section
3.2.
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4 Arbitrary numbers of workers
So far, we have confined ourselves to the patently unrealistic case that each
firm can train at most one worker. As we now show, allowing for the possibil-
ity of training additional workers does not change the basic result that firms
may have incentives to invest in general training. In a sense, it even reinforces
the result: Not only do training equilibria also exist for suitable parameter
values, but, in addition, the no-training equilibrium might disappear.
We first show that under assumption (DRAW) - which applies verbatim to
this more general case - each firm will end up with the same number of workers
in the turnover game, up to integer constraints. We shall then use this result
to state conditions under which equilibria with and without training exist.
Finally, we shall give a detailed interpretation of these conditions.
4.1 The Turnover Game
In this section, we first state conditions under which the turnover game will
lead to an even distribution of educated workers across firms, given that G
workers have been trained in period 1.
Proposition 4 Suppose that assumptions 1- 2 and (DRAW) hold.
(A) Then there exists an equilibrium ( )of the turnover game such that:
(i) If  is an even number 2 then  =  =  .
(ii) If  is an odd number 2 + 1 then  =  − 1 =  for some
 ∈ {1 2}  
 6= 
(B) In both cases, each educated worker obtains wage offers
	∗ () =  ( + 1 − − 1)−  (−) by both firms.
(C) There is no equilibrium with |  −  | 1.
Proof. see Appendix.14
14The result in the appendix uses a slightly weaker requirement than (DRAW) which is
useful for the example in section 4.3.
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The intuition for this result generalizes the ideas from section 3: If
(DRAW) holds and workers are distributed evenly, each firm values an addi-
tional worker less than the competitor values keeping this worker. With an
uneven distribution, the firm with the smaller number of workers is willing
to pay more for at least one of the competitor’s worker than he is prepared
to pay for keeping him. Thus, equilibria must result in an even distribu-
tion of workers. Wages correspond to the value of an additional worker,
 ( + 1 − − 1)−  (−).1516
4.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
We now analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game.
Doing this for a discrete version of the game is tedious, as it requires
distinguishing between even and odd numbers of workers.17 We use a contin-
uous approximation instead. The main insight of the turnover game analyzed
in section 4.1 are: First, if assumption (DRAW) holds,  =  = 2 up
to integer constraints. Second, the equilibrium wage equals the productivity
of the marginal worker, ( ) ≡  ( + 1 − − 1)−  ( −)  A
natural extension to the continuous case would be be to define ( ) ≡


¡

2
 
2
¢
− 

¡

2
 
2
¢
and suppose that the equilibrium wage equals this
quantity: In the continuous case, this is the marginal value of poaching an
15The same equilibrium obtains in a competitive labor market framework when firms
take wages and demand of other firms as given. Therefore, equilibria with training can
occur in a competitive labor market with demand externalities. Details are available from
the authors upon request.
16It is straightforward to show that any other wage profile where everybody is offered
the same wage between  (−)− ( − 1− + 1) and  ( + 1 − − 1)−
 (−) is also an equilibrium with an even distribution of workers. However, these
other equilibria are Pareto-inefficient from the firms’ point of view, since wage costs are
higher than in the equilibrium described in Propositon 4. In the following, we assume that
the firms achieve an equilibrium distribution of workers at minimal wage costs, i.e. we use
the Pareto criterion among firms as a selection device. Since firms make wage offers, this
assumption is plausible.
17We did this in the working paper (Gersbach and Schmutzler, 2001)
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employee for firm , which consists of the effect of employing more workers
oneself
¡


¢
and of reducing the number of workers employed by the com-
petitor
¡
− 

¢
. Using these two results from the discrete game to approxi-
mate the second period equilibrium in the continuous game, we immediately
obtain
Lemma 1 Suppose (DRAW) holds. If firms choose training levels  and 
and the second-period equilibrium is played, firm i’s long-term payoffs in the
continuous approximation of the game are
Π
µ

2


2
¶
−  ·  =

µ

2


2
¶
−
µ

2
¶·


µ

2


2
¶
− 


µ

2


2
¶¸
−  · 
Before deriving conditions for equilibria with and without training, it is
helpful to see how net product market profits react to a marginal increase in
own training. Using lemma 1
Π

=
1
2


+
1
2


− 1
2
µ


− 


¶
− 
4
·
µ
2
()2
− 
2
()2
¶

Generally speaking the total effect of an additional marginal trained
worker thus has the following four components.
(OPE) The own productivity effect on gross product market profits
³
1
2


 0
´
As workers are distributed equally in equilibrium, only half of the marginal
increase in the number of trained workers becomes effective in increasing
product market profits for firm  under consideration.
(CPE) The competitor productivity effect on gross product market profits³
1
2


 0
´
The second half of the increase in trained labor will end up with the
competitor, leading to a negative effect on one’s own product market profit.
(ATW)Wage payments to additional trained workers
³
−1
2
³


− 

´
 0
´
As half of the additional trained labor is employed by the firm under
consideration, this results in additional wage payments.
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(WPTW) Changes in wages per trained worker
³
−
4
·
³
2
()2
− 2
()2
´´
The sign of WPTW is not fully specified by our assumptions. However,
the intuition from section 3 that additional competition among trained work-
ers drives down wages if condition (DRAW) holds, carries over in many cases.
Clearly, this is true if  is concave as a function of  and convex as a func-
tion of . Also, concavity of  (− ) as a function of  implies that
2
()2
+ 
2
()2
− 2 2

 0. Unless 
2

− 2
()2
is very positive,18
2
()2
− 
2
()2
=
2
()2
+
2
()2
− 2 
2

+ 2
µ
2

− 
2
()2
¶
 0
and (WPTW) is therefore positive.
The total effect of OPE, CPE and ATW is 


 0 for marginal changes.
Increasing the number of workers in the market marginally is thus only worth-
while if the negative effect (CPE) is outweighed by the reduction in wages
for inframarginal workers (WPTW).
Even though we do not explicitly treat the case of more than two firms,
this reasoning suggests why, for given market size, training is less likely to
arise in equilibrium for large numbers of firms. First, if there are many firms
in the market, (OPE) is likely to be small, if it is still true that the trained
workers will be spread out equally over firms. Similarly, the effect of one’s
own additional trained workers on the wage level will be small, so that it is
unlikely to be a strong argument for training.
We first give conditions under which an equilibrium without training ex-
ists in the two-firm case.
Proposition 5 Suppose that (DRAW) holds. An equilibrium without train-
ing only exists if
 ( )− ·
·


( )− 


( )
¸
− (0 0)−2 ≤ 0 for all  ≥ 0 (3)
18This is not likely: Typically, at least 
2

 0, roughly speaking, because the positive
effect of trained workers on the own mark-up of a firm is higher when the other firm has
less trained workers and thus faces a smaller market share.
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Proof. Consider firm 1. By lemma 1, deviating from (0 0) to 1  0 gives
a profit of 1
³
1
2
 
1
2
´
− 1
2
h
1
1
³
1
2
 
1
2
´
− 
2
³
1
2
 
1
2
´i
− 1 ·  as compared
to 1 (0 0) in equilibrium. With  = 
1
2
, the statement follows.
For sufficiently low investment costs, (3) will not hold if
 ( )−  (0 0)




( )− 


( ) (4)
for some   0, that is, if the increase in net profit per additional worker
outweighs the wage cost per worker. This is perfectly possible, as we will
show in the example below.
Using similar arguments, we can derive a condition for an equilibrium
with training to exist.
Proposition 6 Suppose (DRAW) holds. Suppose that there exists a   0
such that, for  = 
+
2
,
 ( )−  ·
·


( )− 


( )
¸
− 
is maximized at  = . Then there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium with
  019
Proof. The result follows immediately from lemma 1.
As in the examples of section 3, the equal distribution of workers implied
by (DRAW) is crucial. Suppose that, as an extreme counterexample, one of
the firms attracts all trained workers. Then, using the logic that showed the
necessity of (DRAW) for a training equilibrium in proposition 2, there can
be no training: Both firms will have the same net product market profits,
which amount to the gross profits of the firm without trained workers. These
profits are smaller than gross profits without training. Therefore, in such
cases the training equilibrium cannot exist.
19Proposition 6 implies that deviations to  = 0 should not be beneficial, so that
 ( )− ·
h


( )− 

( )
i
−	−
¡

2 

2
¢
+ 2
h


¡

2 

2
¢
− 

¡

2 

2
¢i
+ 2 ·	 
 0.
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4.3 Example
As a numerical example, we consider the case of price competition of two
firms producing imperfect substitutes, with demand functions   ( ) =
! − 10 + , where 0 ≤ ! ≤ 30. We specify the training technology as
 = 2 exp (−). Thus, marginal costs are  = 2 without training, and
they decrease exponentially with training. For simplicity, we suppose each
firm is restricted to training at most  = 415 workers. Using the logic
of proposition 4, this assumption can be shown to guarantee that workers
are distributed equally in the turnover game. Figure 3 plots equilibrium
training levels as a function of the market size parameter. The outcome is in
line with our general intuition: For low parameter values, no training takes
place. Around ! = 121, there is a discrete jump to a training level  ≈ 245.
As ! increases further, training increases further.
Thus, once again, the intuition that soft competition — in this case, due
to greater market size — fosters training is confirmed.
0
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5 Welfare Results and Policy Discussion
Our analysis is partly motivated by different institutional arrangements in
labor markets across the OECD. In some countries, such as Germany, firms
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offer apprenticeships to their workers. The knowledge acquired in such pro-
grams is mostly general in the sense of being applicable in other firms of
the same industry. Nevertheless, firms bear part of the training costs. In
contrast, the U.S. economy appears to generate less general training than
Germany or Japan, at least at the initial stage of a worker’s life (Blinder and
Kruger 1996, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998).20
In terms of our model, there are two different explanations. For simplicity,
we argue in terms of the model in section 3, even though a generalization to
an arbitrary number of workers is straightforward. Further, suppose that for
each industry under consideration, there is full separation between the Ger-
man and the U.S. labor and product markets. Each of the two corresponds
to one set of parameters of the game.
First, obviously, the relevant parameters of the game could differ for Ger-
many and the US. Roughly speaking, Germany could be in the regime where
proposition 2a applies and the U.S. in the regime where it does not. The
differences might come from industry characteristics such as the intensity of
competition. Alternatively, state interventions might have affected the payoff
functions. Second, one could think of the game as being the same in both
countries, with both countries in different equilibria. German firms have co-
ordinated on the training equilibrium, while US firms are in the no-training
equilibrium.
To understand the welfare implications of the multiple equilibria in the
latter case, we restrict ourselves to the set-up in section 3 with at most one
trained worker per firm. We start by looking at firm profits. It is possible that
the total long-term payoffs for firms are higher in the training equilibrium.
Proposition 7 Suppose that training and no-training equilibria coexist, i.e.
inequality (2) holds. Then, the training equilibrium is better for firms if and
only if
2(1 1)− (2 0)− (0 0) ≥  (5)
20Training investment in later stages of a worker’s life are relatively low in Germany
(OECD 1999), but the differences in the initial stage appear to be more substantial.
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Straightforward derivations show that condition (5) is never satisfied in
the linear Cournot case.21
Next, we compare aggregate welfare in equilibria with and without train-
ing. Aggregate welfare is defined as the sum of long-term payoffs of firms,
wages and consumer surplus. Suppose that firms compete in a market with
homogeneous products and demand function  (). We denote by ∗ (1 2)
the equilibrium prices depending on the distribution of trained workers. In
the training equilibrium, the sum of firms’ long-term payoffs, wages and con-
sumer surplus is given by
2(1 1)− 2 +
∞Z
∗(11)
 ()" (6)
In the no-training equilibrium aggregate welfare is given by
2(0 0) +
∞Z
∗(00)
 ()" (7)
Therefore, we obtain:
Proposition 8 Suppose that training and no-training equilibria coexist. Then
aggregate welfare is higher in the training equilibrium if and only if
2(1 1)− 2(0 0) +
∗(00)Z
∗(11)
 ()"  2 (8)
It is readily verified for the linear Cournot case where each firm can train
at most one worker that, if it exists, the training equilibrium dominates the
no-training equilibrium in terms of welfare (see section 3.3).
21Obviously, condition (5) may hold in other examples, for instance when products
are sufficiently differentiated, so that each firm is essentially a monopolist and hence
 (1 1) ≈  (1 0) 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By combining proposition 7 and 8 for the linear Cournot case with one
trained worker, we observe that firms are better off in the no-training equilib-
rium, but welfare is higher in the training equilibrium. If firms use the Pareto
selection criterion to coordinate themselves on no-training, there could thus
be a role for government policy to reach the training equilibrium. What are
the mechanisms explaining why industries in a country may coordinate on
the training equilibrium while others may not? Potentially, there are at least
three such mechanisms.
First, wage setting institutions may promote the training equilibrium. In
Germany, large employer associations and labor unions negotiate on wages
and working conditions. Establishing curricula and other formal procedures
in connection with negotiations could enhance the chances of achieving the
training equilibrium.
Second, government intervention could bring industries into the training
equilibrium. On the one hand, the state can offer complementary investments
such as schooling facilities where costless classroom education is provided.
Moreover, the government can regulate the curricula and demand that ap-
prentices take standardized exams, as in Germany. On the other hand, tem-
porary support for general training investment may establish a social norm
which will remain after direct support has been withdrawn. Apart from
granting direct financial aid, governments could provide such temporary sup-
port by promoting universal acceptance of certificates from apprenticeships.
Third, in cases where the training equilibrium yields higher total payoffs
for firms, industry associations themselves may facilitate coordination on a
training equilibrium. For instance, by offering special courses for apprentices,
paid from the associations’ budgets, the association may be able to promote
participation in training programs.
Which coordination mechanisms might be at work in Germany or in other
countries is beyond the scope of this paper, but the preceding considerations
raise the question whether complementary activities or temporary support
of the state could be useful to lead firms into the training equilibrium. As an
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example we have seen that government intervention can be justified in the
linear Cournot case.
Perhaps the most important implication of our model is that increasing
competitive intensity might destroy the training equilibrium. This suggests
that the German apprenticeship might come under serious pressure should
competition in manufacturing increase further. More importantly, another
crucial question arises: Can the German apprenticeship survive as firms are
becoming more and more exposed to competitors without such programs?
6 Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper, we provide a theory of general worker training. Our explana-
tion of training does not rely on asymmetric information in the labor market.
Instead, we require imperfect product market competition to generate equi-
libria with general training in a world where turnover is endogenous.
Training equilibria exist for plausible parameter values, possibly together
with the no-training equilibrium. We do not claim that training is likely in all
industries. The most important conditions concern the training technology
and the toughness of product market competition. Competition must be
sufficiently soft and returns to training must decrease sufficiently fast for
turnover to be avoided and training to arise in equilibrium.
The arguments have been cast in a duopoly framework. They appear
to hold more widely in an oligopolistic framework, but it is important to
investigate how the number of firms in a market affects the likelihood of a
training equilibrium. As discussed in section 4.2, a plausible conjecture would
be that training becomes less likely as the number of firms increases, because
competition becomes more intense. One can show that this is indeed the
case in the Cournot case with linear demand.22 For empirical applications
we therefore hypothesize that training tends to be more likely in an industry
22Details about such comparative exercises where the number of firms increases with
and without adjustments of the market size are available upon request from the authors.
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if
• concentration is high or competitive intensity is comparatively low
• returns to training decrease sufficiently in the relevant area
• product differentiation is sufficiently strong.
Whether such hypotheses receive empirical support is an important step
in future research for the further development of a product market theory of
training.
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7 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. For existence, we restrict ourselves to the case where  = 2 is even;
the case  = 2 + 1 is similar. We first show that, given the competitor’s
wage offers 	∗ (), lowering wages is not profitable. Suppose the firm
reduces its wage offer to  workers ( ≤ ) so that it ends up with only
 −  workers. This deviation is not profitable if
 ()−  · 	∗ () ≥  ( −  + ) 
As 	∗ () =  ( + 1  − 1)−  (), this is equivalent to:
 ()−  ( −  + ) ≥  ( ( + 1  − 1)−  ()) 
which is implied by (DRAW). Thus, downward deviation is not profitable.
As to upward deviations, a higher wage offer for one worker would yield
an increase in gross profits of  ( + 1  − 1) −  (), which is ex-
actly offset by the additional wage payments 	∗ (). By (DRAW), at-
tracting any further worker would yield additional gross profits smaller than
 ( + 1  − 1)−  () and thus smaller than the additional wage pay-
ment. Hence, there are no profitable deviations.
To show that there is no equilibrium with    − 1, note that the
willingness of firm  to pay for an additional worker is
 ( + 1 −  − 1)−  ( − ), which by (DRAW) is greater than
 ( − )−  ( − 1 −  + 1), which is the value of the last worker
that firm 
 employs.
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